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Abstract
A linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) game is an incomplete information game with
quadratic payoff functions and Gaussian information structures. It has many applications
such as a Cournot game, a Bertrand game, a beauty contest game, and a network game
among others. LQG information design is a problem to find an information structure from
a given collection of feasible Gaussian information structures that maximizes a quadratic
objective function when players follow a Bayes Nash equilibrium. This paper studies
LQG information design by formulating it as semidefinite programming, which is a natural
generalization of linear programing. Using the formulation, we provide sufficient conditions
for optimality and suboptimality of no and full information disclosure. In the case of
symmetric LQG games, we characterize the optimal symmetric information structure, and
in the case of asymmetric LQG games, we characterize the optimal public information
structure, each of which is in a closed-form expression.
JEL classification: C72, D82.
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design, Bayesian persuasion.
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1 Introduction
An equilibrium outcome in an incomplete information game depends not only upon a payoff
structure, which consists of payoff functions together with a probability distribution of a payoff
state, but also upon an information structure, which maps a payoff state to possibly stochastic
signals of players. Information design analyzes the influence of an information structure on
equilibrium outcomes, and in particular, characterizes an optimal information structure that
induces an equilibrium outcome maximizing the expected value of an objective function of
an information designer, who is assumed to be able to choose and commit to the information
structure.1 General approaches to information design are presented by Bergemann and Morris
(2013, 2016a,b, 2019), Taneva (2019), and Mathevet et al. (2020). A rapidly growing body
of literature have investigated the economic application of information design in areas such as
matching markets (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2010), voting games (Alonso and Camara, 2016),
congestion games (Das et al., 2017), auctions (Bergemann et al., 2017), contests (Zhang and
Zhou, 2016), and stress testing (Inostroza and Pavan, 2018), among others.2
It would be desirable if we could provide general insights on the connection between optimal
information structures and economic environments. Such insights, however, are difficult to
obtain by studying design problems that are either too specific or too general. Taneva (2019)
provides a complete characterization of the optimal information structures in symmetric 2 × 2
incomplete information games with symmetric binary states, thus revealing the connection
between optimal information structures and the binary symmetric environments. To obtain
more insights, we must also consider non-binary environments, but such environments may not
be tractable enough if they are too general.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a tractable class of information design problems
which are not too specific. For this purpose, we focus on an incomplete information game such
that payoff functions are quadratic in actions and payoff states, and payoff states and players’
signals are jointly normally distributed, whose origin goes back to the seminal paper by Radner
(1962). Because payoff functions are arbitrary as long as it is quadratic, this class of games
encompasses a wide class of interesting economic environments such as Cournot and Bertrand
1Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) phrased the design of optimal information structures as a “Bayesian persua-
sion” problem between a sender and single receiver. Information design is also referred to as Bayesian persuasion
to multiple (interacting) receivers.
2See recent survey papers by Bergemann and Morris (2019) and Kamenica (2019).
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oligopoly (Vives, 1984, 1999), beauty contests (Morris and Shin, 2002), and network games
(Calvó-Armengol et al., 2015), among others. In addition, there exists a unique Bayes Nash
equilibrium (BNE) under mild conditions, and it can be calculated as a linear function of signals
(Radner, 1962; Ui, 2016a), which ensures high tractability. This class of games is referred to
as linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games.
We study information design for LQG games, or LQG information design for short. Fix a
payoff structure composed of quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed payoff states,
which is called a basic game in the literature. An information designer has an objective function
that is quadratic in actions and payoff states and can choose and commit to an information
structure from a given collection of feasible Gaussian information structures, which determine
a joint normal distribution of signals and a payoff state with its marginal distribution being the
same as that given by the basic game. LQG information design is a problem to find an optimal
information structure that maximizes the expected value of the quadratic objective function over
the set of feasible Gaussian information structures.
To analyze the problem, we follow the two-step approach of Bergemann and Morris (2013,
2016b, 2019) and Taneva (2019): the first step identifies the set of inducible equilibrium out-
comes under feasible information structures, and the second step identifies the optimal outcomes
from the set of inducible outcomes. Especially, we expand on the analysis of Bergemann and
Morris (2013), who consider a symmetric basic LQG game with a continuum of players. They
identify the set of all symmetric Bayes correlated equilibria (BCE) with normally distributed
actions and show that it coincides with the set of all outcomes that can arise in BNE associ-
ated with all symmetric Gaussian information structures. Then, focusing on a Cournot game
as a special case, they obtain the BCE that maximizes the total expected profit, which is the
equilibrium outcome under the information structure that maximizes the total expected profit.
In our first step, we consider a general class of (possibly asymmetric) basic LQG games with
an arbitrary number of players, and identify the set of all BCEwith normally distributed actions,
which coincides with the set of all inducible equilibrium outcomes under Gaussian information
structures (Bergemann and Morris, 2013, 2016a). It is well known that the expected values
of equilibrium actions do not depend upon the choice of Gaussian information structures in
LQG games (Radner, 1962; Ui, 2016a), and thus the expected values of actions are the same
for all BCE. Therefore, to represent each BCE, it is enough to determine the covariance matrix
of actions and payoff states under the BCE. We show that the set of the covariance matrices
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representing BCE is the set of positive semidefinite matrices satisfying a linear constraint.
In our second step, we show that, for each BCE, the expected value of a quadratic objective
function is represented as a linear function of the covariance matrix representing the BCE,
which is a Frobenius inner product of the covariance matrix and the matrix associated with the
quadratic form in the objective function. Thus, a BCE maximizes the expected value of the
objective function if and only if the covariance matrix representing the BCE is a solution to the
problem to maximize the linear function of a positive semidefinite matrix subject to the linear
constraint. Such an optimization problem is called semidefinite programming (SDP),3 which
is a natural generalization of linear programing.
On the basis of the above discussion, we formulate LQG information design as semidefinite
programming not only when every Gaussian information structure is feasible but also when
feasibility of information structures is defined in terms of additional linear constraints on the
covariance matrix representing BCE. As shown by Taneva (2019), information design with
finite sets of actions is reduced to linear programming. This implies that information design
with infinite sets of actions, such as LQG information design, can be interpreted as linear
programming with infinite number of variables, which is not necessarily tractable. On the
other hand, our semidefinite programming formulation of LQG information design enables
us not only to numerically obtain the optimal information structures but also to analytically
characterize them in some special cases.
As an immediate consequence of the formulation, we obtain simple sufficient conditions
for optimality and suboptimality of no information disclosure. If the matrix associated with
the quadratic form in a quadratic objective function is negative definite, then no information
disclosure is optimal because such an objective function is strictly concave and stochastic actions
decrease its expected value. In contrast, if the matrix is positive definite, then no information
disclosure is never optimal because such an objective function is strictly convex and stochastic
actions increase its expected value.
By focusing on a couple of special cases, we characterize optimal information structures.
First, we consider symmetric LQG games assuming that every symmetric Gaussian information
structure is feasible. In this class of LQG information design, we can represent a quadratic
objective function as a quadratic function of actions, which is independent of payoff states, by
means of the first order condition of BCE. This implies that an objective function is written as a
3See Vandenberghe and Boyd (1996) and Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), for example.
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linear combination of the variance and the covariance of actions. If the objective function equals
the covariance of actions, then full information disclosure is optimal because we can increase
the covariance by providing more precise identical signals to players. If the objective function
equals the difference between the variance and the covariance of actions, then partial information
disclosure is optimal because the difference equals zero under full or no information disclosure.
This observation suggests that it is convenient to rewrite an objective function as a linear
combination of the covariance and the difference between the variance and the covariance. We
characterize the optimal information structure using the ratio of the coefficient of the covariance
and that of the difference between the variance and the covariance in the objective function.
Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) also consider the same class of symmetric LQG games assuming
that each feasible information structure consists of public and private signals and characterize
the optimal combination of public and private signals using the same ratio. This paper shows
that the insight obtained in Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) is also useful in obtaining the optimal
information structures.
We also consider asymmetric LQG games assuming that every public information structure
is feasible, where every player receives identical signals. We characterize the optimal public
information structure as a closed-form expression. This result also gives a sufficient condition
for the optimality of partial information disclosure when all information structures are feasible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces LQG games and charac-
terizes BNE and BCE. Section 3 formulates LQG information design as semidefinite program-
ming. Section 4 is devoted to symmetric LQG games with symmetric information structures,
and Section 5 is devoted to asymmetric LQG games with public information structures.
2 LQG games
2.1 Payoff and information structures
We consider an incomplete information game with quadratic payoff functions and normally
distributed payoff states and signals. We call such a game a linear-quadratic Gaussian game, or
an LQG game for short.
Let 푁 = {1, . . . , 푛} denote the set of players. Player 푖 ∈ 푁 chooses a real number 푎푖 ∈ 퐴푖 ≡ R
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as his action. The payoff function is
푢푖 (푎, 휃) = −푞푖푖푎2푖 − 2
Õ
푗≠푖
푞푖 푗푎푖푎 푗 + 2휃푖푎푖 + ℎ푖 (푎−푖, 휃), (1)
where 푎 ≡ (푎푖)푖∈푁 ∈ 퐴 ≡ R푁 is an action profile, 휃 ≡ (휃푖)푖∈푁 ∈ Θ ≡ R푁 is a payoff state, 푞푖 푗 is
a constant, and ℎ푖 (푎−푖, 휃) is an arbitrary function of the opponents’ actions 푎−푖 ≡ (푎 푗 ) 푗≠푖 and a
payoff state 휃. A payoff state 휃 is a random vector following a multivariate normal distribution
denoted by 휓. We call 퐺 ≡ ((푢푖)푖∈푁 , 휓) a payoff structure or a basic game, which will be fixed
throughout the paper. If 휃1 = · · · = 휃푛 with probability one, 퐺 is called a common value payoff
structure. Let 푄 = [푞푖 푗 ]푛×푛 denote the matrix consisting of the coefficients in the quadratic
terms in (1). We regard vectors such as an action profile 푎 and a payoff state 휃 as column
vectors.
Player 푖 ∈ 푁 receives a private signal 푡푖 ∈ 푇푖 ≡ R푚푖 , which is an 푚푖-dimensional vector.
Let 휋(푡 |휃) denote the conditional probability distribution of a signal profile 푡 ≡ (푡푖)푖∈푁 given 휃,
which is referred to as an information structure. An information structure is said to be Gaussian
if 푡 and 휃 are jointly normally distributed, and every information structure in this paper is
assumed to be Gaussian. If 푡1 = · · · = 푡푛 with probability one, an information structure is said
to be public.
An LQG game consists of a payoff structure (i.e. a basic game) 퐺 and an information
structure 휋. For example, consider an LQG game with a symmetric coefficient matrix 푄, i.e.,
푞푖 푗 = 푞 푗푖 for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 in (1), and another LQG game in which players have identical payoff
functions given by
−푎⊤푄푎 + 2푎⊤휃, (2)
where 푎⊤ is the transpose of 푎. Note that (2) equals (1) if ℎ푖 (푎−푖, 휃) = −Í 푗≠푖 푞 푗 푗푎2푗 −
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Í
푗 ,푘≠푖, 푗≠푘 푞 푗 푘푎 푗푎푘 +
Í
푗≠푖 휃 푗푎 푗 . An LQG game with identical payoff functions is called an
LQG team (Radner, 1962; Ho and Chu, 1972). Clearly, the above two LQG games have the
same best response correspondences because the term ℎ푖 (푎−푖, 휃) does not have any influence
on the player’s decision. That is, the best response correspondences of an LQG game with a
symmetric coefficient matrix 푄 coincide with those of an LQG team. Such an LQG game is
referred to as a potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) and the identical payoff function
(2) of the corresponding LQG team is referred to as a potential function.
We discuss four examples of LQG games, which are also LQG potential games.
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Example 1. Firm 푖 produces good 푖. An action 푞푖 ∈ R is the amount of the output and 휃푖 is the
marginal cost. The inverse demand function is 푝푖 = 훼 − 훽푞푖 − 훾Í 푗≠푖 푞 푗 . Then, the profit of
firm 푖 is (
훼 − 훽푞푖 − 훾
Õ
푗≠푖
푞 푗
)
푞푖 − 휃푖푞푖 .
This LQG game is a Cournot game (Vives, 1984, 1999).
Example 2. Firm 푖 produces good 푖. An action 푝푖 ∈ R is the price of the output and 휃푖 is the
marginal cost. The demand function is 푞푖 = 푎 − 푏푝푖 + 푐Í 푗≠푖 푝 푗 . Then, the profit of firm 푖 is(
푎 − 푏푝푖 + 푐
Õ
푗≠푖
푝 푗
)
푝푖 − 휃푖
(
푎 − 푏푝푖 + 푐
Õ
푗≠푖
푝 푗
)
.
This LQG game is a Bertrand game (Vives, 1984, 1999).
Example 3. Let a coefficient matrix 푄 be given by
푞푖 푗 = 푞 푗푖 =

1 if 푖 = 푗 ,
0 or 훼 if 푖 ≠ 푗 ,
where 훼 ≠ 0 is a constant. The matrix 푄 represents interaction of players located on a graph
with the set of vertices 푁 and the set of edges 퐸 = {(푖, 푗) ∈ 푁2 : 푖 ≠ 푗 , 푞푖 푗 = 훼}. When 휃 is
constant, this is a network game studied by Ballester et al. (2006) and Bramoullé et al. (2014).
Calvó-Armengol et al. (2015) use an LQG network game to analyze endogenous communication
in organizations.
Example 4. Consider an LQG game with a common value payoff structure and a coefficient
matrix 푄 with
푞푖 푗 =

1/(1 − 푟) if 푖 = 푗 ,
푟/(1 − 푟) × 1/(푛 − 1) if 푖 ≠ 푗 ,
where 푟 ∈ (0, 1). Then, the best response equals the conditional expected value of the weighted
average of the arithmetic mean of the opponents’ actions and the common payoff state,4 i.e.,
휎푖 (푡푖) = 푟
Õ
푗≠푖
퐸휋 [휎푗 |푡푖]/(푛 − 1) + (1 − 푟)퐸휋 [휃0 |푡푖] .
This LQG game is a beauty contest game studied by Morris and Shin (2002).
4See (5) in the next section
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2.2 Bayes Nash equilibria and Bayes correlated equilibria
Player 푖’s strategy 휎푖 : 푇푖 → 퐴푖 assigns an action 휎푖 (푡푖) ∈ 퐴푖 to each realization of a private
signal 푡푖 ∈ 푇푖. A strategy profile 휎 = (휎푖)푖∈푁 is a Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) under an
information structure 휋 if, for all 푎′푖 ∈ 퐴푖, 푡푖 ∈ 푇푖, and 푖 ∈ 푁 , it holds that
퐸휋 [푢푖 ((휎푖 (푡푖), 휎−푖), 휃) |푡푖] ≥ 퐸휋 [푢푖 ((푎′푖, 휎−푖), 휃) |푡푖], (3)
where 휎−푖 = 휎−푖 (푡−푖) = (휎푗 (푡 푗 )) 푗≠푖 and 퐸휋 [·|푡푖] is the conditional expectation operator given
푡푖 ∈ 푇푖 with respect to 휋 and 휓. The first-order condition for a BNE is
퐸휋
[ 휕
휕푎푖
푢푖 (휎(푡), 휃)
 푡푖] = −2푞푖푖휎푖 (푡푖) − 2Õ
푗≠푖
푞푖 푗퐸휋 [휎푗 |푡푖] + 2퐸휋 [휃푖 |푡푖] = 0 (4)
for all 푡푖 ∈ 푇푖 and 푖 ∈ 푁 , which is reduced to
휎푖 (푡푖) =
Õ
푗≠푖
푞푖 푗퐸휋 [휎푗 |푡푖]/푞푖푖 + 퐸휋 [휃푖 |푡푖]/푞푖푖 . (5)
Thus, the best response is the conditional expected value of the weighted sum of the opponents’
actions and the payoff state.
Now assume that an information structure 휋 is public with 푡0 = 푡1 = · · · = 푡푛, which we call
a public signal under 휋. Then, (4) is reduced toÕ
푗∈푁
푞푖 푗휎푗 (푡0) = 퐸휋 [휃푖 |푡0] .
Thus, if 푄 is nonsingular, then the equilibrium action profile is (휎푖 (푡0))푖∈푁 = 푄−1퐸휋 [휃 |푡0]
when 푡0 is realized. For example, when 휃 is common knowledge, the equilibrium action profile
is 푄−1휃; when players do not receive any information (i.e., do not update their prior), the
equilibrium action profile is 푎¯ ≡ 푄−1휃¯, where 휃¯ ≡ 퐸 [휃].
Even if an information structure is not public, we can obtain a unique BNE as linear functions
of private signals (Radner, 1962; Ui, 2016a).5
Proposition 1. Suppose that 푄 + 푄⊤ and var(푡푖) are positive definite for each 푖 ∈ 푁 . Then, an
LQG game has a unique BNE given by
휎푖 (푡푖) = 푎¯푖 + 푏⊤푖 (푡푖 − 퐸휋 [푡푖]) for 푖 ∈ 푁, (6)
5Radner (1962) was the first to introduce an LQG team and establishes Proposition 1. As pointed out by Ui
(2009), we can directly use Radner’s result to obtain a unique BNE in an LQG potential game, which corresponds
to Proposition 1 with a symmetric coefficient matrix 푄. Ui (2016a) shows that the symmetry assumption is not
necessary.
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where (푎¯푖)푖∈푁 = 푄−1휃 and 푏1, . . . , 푏푛 are determined by the following system of linear equations:Õ
푗∈푁
푞푖 푗cov(푡푖, 푡 푗 )푏 푗 = cov(푡푖, 휃푖) for 푖 ∈ 푁. (7)
In the rest of this paper, we assume that 푄 + 푄⊤ and var(푡푖) are positive definite for each
푖 ∈ 푁 to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a BNE. Positive definiteness of var(푡푖) implies
that any component of 푡푖 is not informationally redundant. Let Π∗ denote the set of all Gaussian
information structures such that var(푡푖) are positive definite for each 푖 ∈ 푁 .
Imagine that players follow a strategy profile 휎 under an information structure 휋. The
outcome of this situation is described by the conditional probability distribution of 푎 given
휃 because the marginal probability distribution of 휃 is fixed. We denote this conditional
distribution by 휌(푎 |휃) and call it an action distribution of 휎 under 휋, which is given by
휌(푎 |휃) = Í푡:휎(푡)=푎 휋(푡 |휃). In particular, when 휎 is a BNE under 휋, we call 휌 an equilibrium
action distribution under 휋. Every equilibrium action distribution 휌 satisfies the following
condition:
퐸휌 [푢푖 ((푎푖, 푎−푖), 휃) |푎푖] ≥ 퐸휌 [푢푖 ((푎′푖, 푎−푖), 휃) |푎푖] for all 푎푖, 푎′푖 ∈ 퐴푖 and 푖 ∈ 푁 , (8)
where 퐸휌 [·|푎푖] is the conditional expectation operator given 푎푖 with respect to 휌 and 휓. This is
because, by (3), it holds that
퐸휌 [푢푖 ((푎푖, 푎−푖), 휃) |푎푖] = 퐸휋 [푢푖 ((푎푖, 휎−푖), 휃) |휎푖 (푡푖) = 푎푖]
≥ 퐸휋 [푢푖 ((푎′푖, 휎−푖), 휃) |휎푖 (푡푖) = 푎푖] = 퐸휌 [푢푖 ((푎′푖, 푎−푖), 휃) |푎푖] .
We say that an action distribution 휌 is a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) if it satisfies (8).
Thus, an equilibrium action distribution is a BCE because it satisfies (8). Moreover, (8) implies
that a BCE is an equilibrium action distribution under 휋 satisfying the following conditions:
1. 푇푖 = 퐴푖 for all 푖 ∈ 푁; that is, the set of player 푖’s signals coincides with the set of player
푖’s actions.
2. For a BNE 휎 under 휋, 휎푖 (푎푖) = 푎푖 for all 푎푖 ∈ 푇푖 = 퐴푖 and 푖 ∈ 푁; that is, an equilibrium
action distribution is given by 휋(푎 |휃).
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition due to Bergemann and Morris
(2013).
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Proposition 2. Under any information structure, an equilibrium action distribution is a BCE.
For any BCE, there exists an information structure under which the equilibrium action distri-
bution coincides with the BCE.
Using Propositions 1 and 2, we can obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for an action
distribution to be a BCEwhere an action profile and a payoff state are jointly normally distributed
Proposition 3. An action distribution 휌 is a BCE under which (푎, 휃) is normally distributed if
and only if the following condition is satisfied.
퐸휌 [푎] = 푎¯, (9)Õ
푗∈푁
푞푖 푗cov(푎푖, 푎 푗 ) = cov(푎푖, 휃푖). (10)
Proof. A necessary and sufficient condition for a BCE is (6) and (7) with 푏푖 = 1 and 푎¯푖 = 퐸휋 [푡푖]
by Proposition 1, which establishes this proposition. □
Bergemann and Morris (2013) obtain Proposition 3 in the case of symmetric LQG games
with common value payoff structures.
3 LQG information design
3.1 A general formulation
Fix a payoff structure (i.e. a basic game) 퐺 = ((푢푖)푖∈푁 , 휓) such that 푄 +푄⊤ is positive definite.
We consider an information designer who chooses an information structure 휋 from a set of
feasible information structures Π ⊆ Π∗ to maximize the expected value of a quadratic objective
function 푣(푎, 휃). The designer can make a commitment to provide information according to the
following timeline, which is a standard assumption in the literature.
1. The designer chooses 휋 ∈ Π and informs all players of 휋.
2. When 휃 is realized, 푡1, . . . , 푡푛 are drawn according to 휋(푡 |휃).
3. Players follow the unique BNE under 휋.
Note that we have focused on a payoff structure such that any information structure induces a
unique equilibrium.6
6See Mathevet et al. (2020) for detailed discussions on information design with multiple equilibria.
10
Without loss of generality, we omit linear terms in a quadratic objective function 푣(푎, 휃)
because the expected value of (푎, 휃) is a constant vector (푎¯, 휃¯) in a BNE under any information
structure. Thus, we use a quadratic form to represent 푣(푎, 휃). Let S푘 and S푘+ denote the set of
all 푘 × 푘 symmetric matrices and the set of all 푘 × 푘 positive semidefinite symmetric matrices,
respectively. Then, a quadratic objective function is given by
푣(푎, 휃) = [푎⊤, 휃⊤]푉

푎
휃
 = tr ©­«푉

푎푎⊤푎휃⊤
휃푎⊤휃휃⊤
ª®¬ = tr
(
푉11푎푎
⊤) + 2tr (푉12휃푎⊤) + tr (푉22휃휃⊤) ,
(11)
where
푉 = [푣푖 푗 ]2푛×2푛 =

[푣푖 푗 ]푛×푛 [푣푖,푛+ 푗 ]푛×푛
[푣푛+푖, 푗 ]푛×푛 [푣푛+푖,푛+ 푗 ]푛×푛
 =

푉11 푉12
푉21 푉22
 ∈ S2푛.
We can assume that 푉22 = 푂, i.e., 푣푛+푖,푛+ 푗 = 0 for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 , because the expected value of
tr (푉22휃휃⊤) is a constant determined by the payoff structure 퐺.
An LQG information design problem is the problem to find an information structure that
maximizes the expected value of the objective function over the set of feasible information
structures:
max
휋∈Π
퐸휋 [푣(휎, 휃)], (12)
where 퐸휋 is the expectation operator with respect to 휋 and 휎 is the unique BNE under 휋.
Using the equilibrium action distribution 휌 under 휋, we can replace 퐸휋 [푣(휎, 휃)] in (12) with
퐸휌 [푣(푎, 휃)], where 퐸휌 is the expectation operator with respect to 휌. Thus, (12) is equivalent to
max
휌∈C(Π)
퐸휌 [푣(푎, 휃)], (13)
where
C(Π) = {휌 : 휌 is the equilibrium action distribution under 휋 ∈ Π}.
Using the representation (11), we can rewrite the objective function in (13) as
퐸휌 [푣(푎, 휔)] = tr ©­«푉

var(푎) cov(푎, 휃)
cov(휃, 푎) var(휃)
ª®¬ + tr ©­«푉

푎¯푎¯⊤푎¯휃¯⊤
휃¯푎¯⊤휃¯ 휃¯⊤
ª®¬ = 푉 • 푋 + const., (14)
where
푋 = [푥푖 푗 ]2푛×2푛 =

var(푎) cov(푎, 휃)
cov(휃, 푎) var(휃)
 ∈ S2푛+ and 푉 • 푋 =
2푛Õ
푖=1
2푛Õ
푗=1
푣푖 푗푥푖 푗 .
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Thus, (13) is equivalent to
max
푋∈X(Π)
푉 • 푋, (15)
where
X(Π) = {푋 ∈ S2푛+ : 푋 is the covariance matrix of (푎, 휃) under 휌 ∈ C(Π)}.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solution to (13) and that to (15)
becauseX(Π) is the collection of the covariance matrices of (푎, 휃) under the equilibrium action
distributions.
For example, when players receive no signals, they follow푄−1휃¯ in the equilibrium, and thus
푋 =

푂 푂
푂 var(휃)
 and 푉 • 푋 = 푂.
This case is referred to as no information disclosure. When 휃 is common knowledge, players
follow 푄−1휃 in the equilibrium, and thus
푋 =

푄−1var(휃) (푄−1)⊤ 푄−1var(휃)
var(휃)(푄−1)⊤ var(휃)
 and 푉 • 푋 = 푉푄 • var(휃),
where
푉푄 ≡ (푄−1)⊤(푉11 +푉12푄 +푄⊤푉21)푄−1.
This case is referred to as full information disclosure. The other cases are referred to as partial
information disclosure.
As an immediate consequence of (15), we can obtain the following simple sufficient condi-
tions for optimality and suboptimality of no information disclosure.
Proposition 4. If 푉 is negative semidefinite, then no information disclosure is optimal in Π∗. If
푉 is positive definite, then no information disclosure is not optimal in Π∗.
Proof. It is well known that if 푉 is negative semidefinite, then 푉 • 푋 ≤ 0 for any 푋 ∈ S2푛+ ,
which implies that no information disclosure is optimal. If 푉 is positive definite, then
푉 • 푋 = 퐸휌
([푎⊤ − 푎¯⊤, 휃⊤ − 휃¯⊤])푉 ©­«

푎 − 푎¯
휃 − 휃¯
ª®¬
 > 0
under partial or full information disclosure, so no information disclosure is not optimal. □
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3.2 Semidefinite programming formulation
We consider a special case of (15) in which all information structures are feasible:
max
푋∈X(Π∗)
푉 • 푋. (16)
The constraint 푋 ∈ X(Π∗) consists of the following three conditions by Proposition 3.
(i) var(휃) = [cov(휃푖, 휃 푗 )]푛×푛 = [푥푛+푖,푛+ 푗 ]푛×푛 is the covariance matrix of 휃 given by a payoff
structure 퐺. This condition is rewritten as
푆푘푙 • 푋 = cov(휃푘 , 휃푙) for all 푘, 푙 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛} with 푘 ≤ 푙, (17)
where 푆푘푙 = [푠푘푙,푖 푗 ]2푛×2푛 ∈ S2푛 is given by, for 푖, 푗 ∈ {1, . . . , 2푛} with 푖 ≤ 푗 ,
푠푘푙,푖 푗 =

1/2 if 푘 < 푙, 푖 = 푛 + 푘, 푗 = 푛 + 푙,
1 if 푘 = 푙, 푖 = 푛 + 푘, 푗 = 푛 + 푙,
0 otherwise.
(ii)
Í
푗∈푁 푞푖 푗cov(푎푖, 푎 푗 ) = cov(푎푖, 휃푖); that is,
Í
푗∈푁 푞푖 푗푥푖 푗 = 푥푖,푛+푖 for all 푖 ∈ 푁 . This condition
is rewritten as
푅푘 • 푋 = 0 for all 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛}, (18)
where 푅푘 = [푟푘,푖 푗 ]2푛×2푛 ∈ S2푛 is given by
푟푘,푖 푗 =

푞푘푘 if 푖 = 푗 = 푘,
푞푘 푗/2 if 푖 = 푘, 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푛, 푗 ≠ 푘,
−1/2 if 푖 = 푘, 푗 = 푛 + 푘,
푞푘푖/2 if 푗 = 푘, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛, 푖 ≠ 푘,
−1/2 if 푗 = 푘, 푖 = 푛 + 푘,
0 otherwise.
(iii) 푋 is a positive semidefinite matrix, i.e., 푋 ∈ S2푛+ .
Thus, (16) is reduced to a problem to maximize a linear function of a positive semidefinite
matrix 푋 subject to linear constraints (i) and (ii):
max푉 • 푋 s.t. 푅푘 • 푋 = 0 for all 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛},
푆푘푙 • 푋 = cov(휃푘 , 휃푙) for all 푘, 푙 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛} with 푘 ≤ 푙, (19)
푋 ∈ S2푛+ .
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Such a problem is called a semidefinite programming (SDP) problem.7
We have shown that (15) is reduced to a SDP problem when Π = Π∗. Nonetheless, even
when Π ⊊ Π∗, if X(Π) ⊊ X(Π∗) is given by some linear constraints on 푋 ∈ X(Π∗), i.e., there
exist 푀1, . . . , 푀퐾 ∈ S2푛 and 푚1, . . . , 푚퐾 ∈ R such that
X(Π) = {푋 ∈ X(Π∗) : 푀푘 • 푋 = 푚푘 for all 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 퐾}},
then (15) is reduced to a SDP problem to maximize a linear function of a positive semidefinite
matrix 푋 subject to linear constraints (i), (ii), and 푀푘 • 푋 = 푚푘 for all 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 퐾}.
The KKT condition for a SDP problem is well known. The next proposition gives that for
(19).
Proposition 5. If 푋¯ ∈ S2푛+ is a solution to (19), then there exist 휆¯ ∈ R푛, 휇¯ ∈ R푛(푛+1)/2, Ξ¯ ∈ S2푛+
satisfying the following condition.
−푉 −
푛Õ
푘=1
휆¯푘푅푘 −
푛Õ
푘=1
푘Õ
푙=푙
휇¯푘푙푆푘푙 = Ξ¯,
푅푘 • 푋¯ = 0 for all 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛},
푆푘푙 • 푋¯ = cov(휃푘 , 휃푙) for all 푘, 푙 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛} with 푘 ≤ 푙,
푋¯ • Ξ¯ = 0.
Conversely, if there exist 휆¯ ∈ R푛, 휇¯ ∈ R푛(푛+1)/2, Ξ¯, 푋¯ ∈ S2푛+ satisfying the above condition, then
푋¯ is a solution to (19).
On the basis of the SDP formulation of LQG information design, we can numerically obtain
optimal information structures using SDP solvers, and in some cases, we can analytically obtain
them, as will be discussed in the subsequent sections.
Before closing this subsection, we focus on the case of common value payoff structures with
휃0 = 휃1 = · · · = 휃푛, which will be discussed in Section 4. To represent an objective function, it
is enough to consider the covariance matrix of (푎, 휃0) denoted by
푋′ = [푥푖 푗 ](푛+1)×(푛+1) ≡

var(푎) cov(푎, 휃0)
cov(휃0, 푎) var(휃0)
 ∈ S푛+1+ .
7See Vandenberghe and Boyd (1996) and Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), for example.
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Thus, by appropriately choosing 푉 ′ ∈ S푛+1, we can rewrite (19) as
max푉 ′ • 푋′ s.t. 푅푘 • 푋′ = 0 for all 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛},
푆 • 푋′ = var(휃0), (20)
푋 ∈ S푛+1+ ,
where 푅푘 = [푟푘,푖 푗 ](푛+1)×(푛+1) ∈ S푛+1 and 푆 = [푠푖 푗 ](푛+1)×(푛+1) ∈ S푛+1 are given by
푟푘,푖 푗 =

푞푘푘 if 푖 = 푗 = 푘,
푞푘 푗/2 if 푖 = 푘, 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푛, 푗 ≠ 푘,
−1/2 if 푖 = 푘, 푗 = 푛 + 1,
푞푘푖/2 if 푗 = 푘, 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛, 푖 ≠ 푘,
−1/2 if 푗 = 푘, 푖 = 푛 + 1,
0 otherwise,
푠푖 푗 =

1 if 푖 = 푛 + 1, 푗 = 푛 + 1,
0 otherwise.
3.3 Public information structures
LetΠ푝 ⊆ Π∗ denote the collection of all public information structures. We discuss a special case
of (15) when Π = Π푝. As an immediate consequence of the formulation, we provide sufficient
conditions for optimality of no or full information disclosure in the set of public information
structures and sufficient conditions for suboptimality of no or full information disclosure in the
set of all information structures.
Recall that, under a public information structure 휋 ∈ Π푝, the equilibrium action profile is
푄−1퐸휋 [휃 |푡0], where 푡0 is a public signal. When players follow 푄−1퐸휋 [휃 |푡0], the covariance
matrix of (푎, 휃) is given by
푋 =

푄−1var(퐸휋 [휃 |푡0]) (푄−1)⊤ 푄−1var(퐸휋 [휃 |푡0])
var(퐸휋 [휃 |푡0]) (푄−1)⊤ var(휃)
 ,
and thus we have
푉 • 푋 = 푉푄 • var(퐸휋 [휃 |푡0]).
This implies that we can obtain the optimal public information structure by solving
max
푍∈Z
푉푄 • 푍, (21)
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whereZ = {푍 : 푍 = var(퐸휋 [휃 |푡0]), 휋 ∈ Π푝}}. Note thatZ is the set of all covariance matrices
of the conditional expected value of 휃 under 휋 ∈ Π푝, which is characterized as follows.
Lemma 1. Let 퐷 be an 푛 × 푘 matrix of rank 푘 such that var(휃) = 퐷퐷⊤ and 푘 is the rank of
var(휃), which is known to exist. Then, it holds thatZ = {푍 : 푍 = 퐷푆퐷⊤, 푆 ∈ S푘+ , 퐼 − 푆 ∈ S푘+ }.
Proof. There exist 푘 random variables 휉1, . . . , 휉푘 ∈ R that are independently and identically
distributed according to the standard normal distribution such that 휃 = 퐷휉 + 휃¯. Thus,
var(퐸휋 [휃 |푡0]) = var(퐷퐸휋 [휉 |푡0]) = 퐷var(퐸휋 [휉 |푡0])퐷⊤.
Because 푆 = 퐸휋 [휉 |푡0] ∈ S푘+ can be arbitrary as long as 푆 ∈ S푘+ and 퐼 − 푆 ∈ S푘+ , this lemma
holds. □
By this lemma, for each 푍 ∈ Z, there exists 푆 ∈ S푘+ with 푍 = 퐷푆퐷⊤, and it holds that
푉푄 • 푍 = 푉푄 • 퐷푆퐷⊤ = tr (푉푄퐷푆퐷⊤) = tr (퐷⊤푉푄퐷푆) = 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 • 푆.
Thus, (21) is reduced to
max
푆
퐷⊤푉푄퐷 • 푆 s.t. 푆 ∈ S푘+ and 퐼 − 푆 ∈ S푘+ . (22)
If 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 = 푂, then every information structure is optimal, so we assume that 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 ≠ 푂.
We will solve (22) in Section 5, but we discuss a couple of immediate consequences of (22)
here. The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for optimality of no information
disclosure in Π푝.
Proposition 6. Suppose that 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 ≠ 푂 is negative semidefinite. Then, no information
disclosure is optimal in Π푝, and full information disclosure is not optimal in Π푝.
Proof. The matrix 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 is factored as 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 = 푈Λ푈⊤, where 푈 is orthogonal and Λ is
diagonal. Thus,
퐷⊤푉푄퐷 • 푆 = tr[퐷⊤푉푄퐷푆] = tr[푈Λ푈⊤푆] = tr[Λ푈⊤푆푈] =
푘Õ
푙=1
휆푙훾푙 , (23)
where 휆푙 and 훾푙 are the 푙-th diagonal elements of Λ and 푈⊤푆푈, respectively. Note that
0 ≤ 훾푙 ≤ 1 for all 푙 because 푈⊤푆푈 and 푈⊤(퐼 − 푆)푈 = 퐼 − 푈⊤푆푈 are positive semidefinite.
Because 퐷푇푉푄퐷 ≠ 푂 is negative semidefinite, 휆푙 ≤ 0 for all 푙 and 휆푙 < 0 for at least one 푙.
Thus, 훾푙 = 0 for all 푙 is optimal, and 훾푙 = 1 for all 푙 is not optimal. The former case corresponds
to no information disclosure 푆 = 0 and the latter case corresponds to full information disclosure
푆 = 퐼. □
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Similarly, the following proposition provides a sufficient condition for optimality of full
information disclosure in Π푝.
Proposition 7. Suppose that 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 ≠ 푂 is positive semidefinite. Then, full information
disclosure is optimal in Π푝, and no information disclosure is not optimal in Π푝.
Proof. Because 퐷푇푉푄퐷 ≠ 푂 is positive semidefinite, 휆푙 ≥ 0 for all 푙 and 휆푙 > 0 for at least
one 푙 in (23). Thus, 훾푙 = 1 for all 푙 is optimal, and 훾푙 = 0 for all 푙 is not optimal. □
For example, consider a common value payoff structure. Because 휃0 = 휃1 = · · · = 휃푛, we
have 퐷 = var(휃0)1/21, where 1 = (1, . . . , 1)⊤ ∈ R푛 is the 푛-dimensional column vector with
all entries one. Thus, by Propositions 6 and 7, full information disclosure is optimal in Π푝 if
1⊤푉푄1 > 0, and no information disclosure is optimal in Π푝 if 1⊤푉푄1 < 0.
Propositions 6 and 7 have the following implication for suboptimality of no or full informa-
tion disclosure in Π∗.
Corollary 8. If 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 ≠ 푂 is negative semidefinite, then full information disclosure is not
optimal in Π∗. If 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 ≠ 푂 is positive semidefinite, then no information disclosure is not
optimal in Π∗.
In Section 5, we characterize optimal public information structures when 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 is neither
positive semidefinite nor negative semidefinite and show that partial information disclosure is
optimal in Π푝, which also implies that partial information disclosure is optimal in Π∗ as well.
3.4 Some characterization when 푣푖,푛+ 푗 = 0 for 푖 ≠ 푗
We consider a special case in which the correlation between player 푖’s action 푎푖 and player 푗’s
payoff state 휃 푗 has no influence on the objective function; that is, 푣푖,푛+ 푗 = 0 for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 with
푖 ≠ 푗 . The following two cases are typical.
• Player 푖’s payoff function 푢푖 (푎, 휃) is independent of 휃 푗 and an objective function 푣(푎, 휃)
is the sum of all players’ payoff functions, i.e., 푣(푎, 휃) = Í푖∈푁 푢푖 (푎, 휃).
• A payoff structure is of common value (i.e., 휃1 = · · · = 휃푛), where we can replace 푎푖휃 푗
with 푎푖휃푖, thus making the coefficient of 푎푖휃 푗 zero.
In this case, we can obtain a simple representation of 푉 • 푋 in (15). Although 푉 • 푋 is a linear
function of the covariance matrix of an action profile 푎 and a payoff state 휃, we can replace it
with a linear function of the covariance matrix of an action profile alone.
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Lemma 2. Let 푉 = [푣푖 푗 ]2푛×2푛 ∈ S2푛 and 푊 = [푤푖 푗 ]푛×푛 ∈ S푛 be such that 푣푖,푛+ 푗 = 0 for all
푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 with 푖 ≠ 푗 and 푤푖 푗 = 푣푖 푗 + 푣푖,푛+푖푞푖 푗 + 푣 푗 ,푛+ 푗푞 푗푖 for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 . If
푋 =

푋11 푋12
푋21 푋22
 =

var(푎) cov(푎, 휃)
cov(휃, 푎) var(휃)
 ∈ X(Π),
then
푉 • 푋 = 푊 • 푋11.
Proof. Because 푣푖,푛+ 푗 = 0 for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 with 푖 ≠ 푗 and 푣푛+푖,푛+ 푗 = 0 for all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 , we have
푉 • 푋 =
푛Õ
푖=1
푛Õ
푗=1
푣푖 푗cov(푎푖, 푎 푗 ) + 2
푛Õ
푖=1
푣푖,푛+푖cov(푎푖, 휃푖).
By plugging (10) into the above,
푉 • 푋 =
푛Õ
푖=1
푛Õ
푗=1
(푣푖 푗 + 2푣푖,푛+푖푞푖 푗 )cov(푎푖, 푎 푗 ) = 푊 • 푋11,
which establishes the lemma. □
By Lemma 2, we can reformulate (15) as
max
푋11: 푋∈X(Π)
푊 • 푋11. (24)
Using (24), we provide simple sufficient conditions for optimality and suboptimality of no
information disclosure, which is analogous to Proposition 4.
Proposition 9. Suppose that no information disclosure is feasible. If푊 is negative semidefinite,
then it is optimal. If푊 is positive definite, then it is not optimal.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that of Proposition 4, so it is omitted. □
On the other hand, if푄 is symmetric and푊 equals a constant times푄, then full information
disclosure is optimal.
Proposition 10. Suppose that full information disclosure is feasible. If 푄 is symmetric and
there exists 푐 > 0 such that푊 = 푐푄, then it is optimal.
Proof. Consider an LQG team with a payoff function (2) and let 푣(푎, 휃) = Í푖∈푁 푢푖 (푎, 휃)/푛.
Because every player’s payoff function coincides with the objective function, full information
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disclosure is optimal. In this case, 푉 = [푣푖 푗 ]2푛×2푛 is given by
푣푖 푗 =

푞푖 푗 if 1 ≤ 푖, 푗 ≤ 푛,
1 if 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푛, 푖 = 푛 + 푗 or 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛, 푗 = 푛 + 푖,
0 otherwise,
which satisfies the condition in Lemma 2. Thus, by Lemma 2, it holds that 푉 • 푋 = 푊 • 푋11,
where 푊 = 3푄. This implies that full information disclosure is optimal if 푊 = 푐푄 for any
푐 > 0. □
As applications of Propositions 9 and 10, we compare two types of public goods games with
different payoff structures.
Example 5. Player 푖’s contribution is 푎푖, the marginal cost is 휃푖, and the production of a public
good is −푎⊤푀푎 + 2훾⊤푎, where 푀 ∈ S푛+ is a positive definite matrix and 훾 ∈ R푛 is a constant
vector. Then, the payoff function is (−푎⊤푀푎 + 2훾⊤푎) − 휃푖푎푖. Let 푣(푎, 휃) = Í푖∈푁 푢푖 (푎, 휃);
that is, the objective function is the total payoff. Then, the condition in Lemma 2 is satisfied,
and 푊 is shown to be negative definite. Therefore, no information disclosure is optimal by
Proposition 9. This is because the production is independent of 휃 and concave in 푎, so we can
increase the expected total payoff by making 푎 constant. Teoh (1997) shows similar optimality
of no information disclosure in a public goods game, which is not an LQG game.
Example 6. Player 푖’s contribution is 푎푖, the marginal cost is a constant 훾푖, and the production
of a public good is −푎⊤푀푎 + 2휃⊤푎, where 푀 ∈ S푛+ is a positive definite matrix. Then, the
payoff function is (−푎⊤푀푎 + 2휃⊤푎) − 훾푖푎푖. Let 푣(푎, 휃) = Í푖∈푁 푢푖 (푎, 휃); that is, the objective
function is the total payoff. Then, the condition in Lemma 2 is satisfied, and푊 is shown to be
a constant times 푄. Therefore, full information disclosure is optimal by Proposition 10. This is
because the production level depends upon 휃, so we can increase the expected total payoff by
allowing 푎 to adjust to 휃.
4 Symmetric common value payoff structures
In this section, we solve an LQG information design problem by focusing on symmetric common
value payoff structures and symmetric information structures. A payoff structure is said to be
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symmetric if 푞푖푖 and 푞푖 푗 are constant across 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 with 푖 ≠ 푗 . By normalizing 푞푖푖 = 1 for all
푖 ∈ 푁 , we obtain the following payoff function:
푢푖 (푎, 휃) = −푎2푖 + 2훼푎푖
Í
푗≠푖 푎 푗
푛 − 1 + 2휃0푎0 + ℎ푖 (푎−푖, 휃0).
This game exhibits strategic complementarities if 훼 > 0 and strategic substitutabilities if 훼 < 0.
Note that a coefficient matrix 푄 is given by
푄 =

1 푞 · · · 푞
푞 1 · · · 푞
...
...
. . .
푞 푞 · · · 1

∈ S푛 (25)
with 푞 = −훼/(푛 − 1). Because the 푘-th leading principal minor is (1 + (푘 − 1)푞) (1 − 푞)푘−1, 푄
is positive definite if and only if −(푛 − 1) < 훼 < 1, which is assumed throughout this section.
Because the payoff structure is of common value, we solve the problem (20) restricting
attention to symmetric information structures. An information structure 휋 ∈ Π∗ is said to be
symmetric if푇푖, var(푡푖), and cov(푡푖, 푡 푗 ) are constant across 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 with 푖 ≠ 푗 . In the equilibrium,
we can write 휎2푎 = var(푎푖), 휌푎휎2푎 = cov(푎푖, 푎 푗 ), 휌푎휃휎푎휎휃 = cov(푎푖, 휃0), and 휎2휃 = var(휃0) for
all 푖, 푗 ∈ 푁 with 푖 ≠ 푗 by the symmetry of both payoff and information structures. Thus, without
loss of generality, the objective function is written as
푉 ′ • 푋′ = 푛푣1휎2푎 + 푛(푛 − 1)푣2휌푎휎2푎 + 2푛푣3휌푎휃휎푎휎휃 ,
where
푉 ′ =

푣1 푣2 · · · 푣2 푣3
푣2 푣1 · · · 푣2 푣3
...
...
. . .
...
...
푣2 푣2 · · · 푣1 푣3
푣3 푣3 · · · 푣3 0

, 푋′ =

휎2푎 휌푎휎
2
푎 · · · 휌푎휎2푎 휌푎휃휎푎휎휃
휌푎휎
2
푎 휎
2
푎 · · · 휌푎휎2푎 휌푎휃휎푎휎휃
...
...
. . .
...
...
휌푎휎
2
푎 휌푎휎
2
푎 · · · 휎2푎 휌푎휃휎푎휎휃
휌푎휃휎푎휎휃 휌푎휃휎푎휎휃 · · · 휌푎휃휎푎휎휃 휎2휃

.
Because a payoff structure is of common value, we can use Lemma 2 to rewrite 푉 ′ • 푋′ as a
linear combination of the variance and the covariance of actions:
푉 ′ • 푋′ = 푊 • 푋11 = 푛푐휎2푎 + 푛(푛 − 1)푑휌푎휎2푎 ,
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where
푊 =

푐 푑 · · · 푑
푑 푐 · · · 푑
...
...
. . .
...
푑 푑 · · · 푐

with 푐 = 푣1 + 2푣3 and 푑 = 푣2 + 2푣3푞. The constraints 푋′ ∈ S푛+1+ , 푆 • 푋′ = var(휃0), and
푅′푘 • 푋′ = 0 are reduced to
휌2푎휃 ≤
푛 − 1
푛
휌푎 + 1
푛
, (26)
휎푎 =
휌푎휃휎휃
1 − 훼휌푎 , (27)
where (26) is derived from the Schur complement of 푋′.
By Proposition 9, if 푐 ≤ 푑 ≤ −푐/(푛 − 1), then no information disclosure is optimal because
푊 is negative semidefinite.8 By Proposition 10, if 푐 > 0 and 푑 = −훼푐/(푛 − 1), then full
information disclosure is optimal because푊 = 푐푄 and 푐 > 0.
We can also characterize the optimal information structure in the other cases by direct
calculation. Let 휁 = 푛푐 and 휂 = 푛(푐 + (푛 − 1)푑), whereby the objective function is
퐹 (휎푎, 휌푎) ≡ (휁 + (휂 − 휁)휌푎)휎2푎 = 휁 (1 − 휌푎)휎2푎 + 휂휌푎휎2푎 . (28)
If 휁 = 0 and 휂 = 1, then 퐹 (휎푎, 휌푎) = 휌푎휎2푎 , so full information disclosure is optimal because
the covariance of actions 휌푎휎2푎 is maximized when all players know 휃0. In contrast, if 휁 = 1 and
휂 = 0, then 퐹 (휎푎, 휌푎) = (1 − 휌푎)휎2푎 , so full information disclosure cannot be optimal because
the subtraction of the covariance from the variance of actions (1 − 휌푎)휎2푎 is minimized when
all players know 휃0. This observation suggests that the optimal information structure can be
understood in terms of the ratio of 휂 and 휁 as well as their signs, which is confirmed by the
following proposition.
Proposition 11. The optimal information structure is given below.
(i) Full information disclosure is optimal if 휂 > 0 and 휂 ≥ 푛(1 − 훼)휁/(2푛 − 1 + 훼).
8Principle minors of 푊 are (푐 + (푘 − 1)푑) (푐 − 푑)푘−1 for 푘 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛}, so we can verify that 푊 is negative
semidefinite if and only if 푐 ≤ 푑 ≤ −푐/(푛 − 1).
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(ii) Partial information disclosure is optimal if 휁 > 휂/푛 and 휁 > (2푛 − 1 + 훼)휂/(푛(1 − 훼)),
where the optimal covariance matrix of (푎, 휃0) is given by
휌푎 = −((2훼 + 푛 − 2)휁 + 휂)/(((푛 − 2)훼 − 2(푛 − 1))휁 + (훼 + 2(푛 − 1))휂), (29)
휌푎휃 =
√
(푛 − 1)휌푎/푛 + 1/푛, (30)
휎2푎 = 휌
2
푎휃휎
2
휃 /(1 − 훼휌푎)2. (31)
(iii) No information disclosure is optimal if 휂 ≤ 0 and 휁 ≤ 휂/푛.
Proof. We maximize (28) subject to (26) and (27). Plugging (27) into (28), we have
퐹 (휎푎, 휌푎) = (휁 + (휂 − 휁)휌푎)
(
휌푎휃휎휃
1 − 훼휌푎
)2
.
By (26), −1/(푛 − 1) ≤ 휌푎 ≤ 1 and(
휌푎휃휎휃
1 − 훼휌푎
)2
≤ 휎
2
휃
(1 − 훼휌푎)2
(
푛 − 1
푛
휌푎 + 1
푛
)
.
Thus, by setting
푓 (푥) ≡ 휎2휃
휁 + (휂 − 휁)푥
(1 − 훼푥)2
(
푛 − 1
푛
푥 + 1
푛
)
,
we obtain
퐹 (휎푎, 휌푎) ≤ max{0, 푓 (휌푎)} ≤ max
푥∈[−1/(푛−1),1]
푓 (푥).
Moreover, by (26) and (27), if 휌푎 ∈ argmax푥∈[−1/(푛−1),1] 푓 (푥), then 퐹 (휎푎, 휌푎) = 푓 (휌푎) with
(30) and (31), where 휌푎 = 1 implies full information disclosure because 휌푎휃 = 1 by (30), and
휌푎 = −1/(푛 − 1) implies no information disclosure because 휎2푎 = 0 and 휌푎휎2푎 = 0 by (31).
Therefore, to maximize 퐹 (휎푎, 휌푎) subject to (26) and (27), it is enough to solve
max
−1/(푛−1)≤푥≤1
푓 (푥). (32)
The first derivative of 푓 (푠) is
푓 ′(푥) = 휙(푥)
푛(1 − 훼푥)3 ,
where the numerator
휙(푥) = (((푛 − 2) 훼 − 2 (푛 − 1)) 휁 + (훼 + 2 (푛 − 1)) 휂) 푥 + (2훼 + 푛 − 2) 휁 + 휂
is a linear function of 푥, and the denominator is positive since−(푛−1) < 훼 < 1 and−1/(푛−1) ≤
푥 ≤ 1.
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Suppose that 푓 ′(−1/(푛 − 1)) > 0 and 푓 ′(1) < 0, which is true if and only if 휁 > 휂/푛 and
휁 > (2푛 − 1 + 훼)휂/(푛(1 − 훼)) because
휙(−1/(푛 − 1)) = (푛 − 1 + 훼) (푛휁 − 휂)
푛 − 1 and 휙(1) = −푛(1 − 훼)휁 + (2푛 − 1 + 훼)휂.
In this case, (32) has an interior solution 휌푎 with 푓 ′(휌푎) = 0 (i.e. 휙(휌푎) = 0), and 휌푎 in (29) is
the unique solution.
Suppose otherwise. Then, (32) has a corner solution and
max
−1/(푛−1)≤푥≤1
푓 (푥) = max{ 푓 (−1/(푛 − 1)), 푓 (1)} = max
{
0,
휎2휃 휂
(1 − 훼)2
}
.
If 휂 > 0, then 휌푎 = 휌푎휃 = 1 at the corner solution, which implies the optimality of full
information disclosure. Because 휂 > 0 implies (2푛 − 1 + 훼)휂/(푛(1 − 훼)) > 휂/푛, we must have
휁 ≤ (2푛−1+훼)휂/(푛(1−훼)). If 휂 ≤ 0, then 휌푎휃 = −1/(푛−1) at the corner solution, which implies
the optimality of no information disclosure. Because 휂 ≤ 0 implies (2푛− 1+훼)휂/(푛(1−훼)) ≤
휂/푛, we must have 휁 ≤ 휂/푛. □
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal information structures, where the horizontal axis is the 휁-axis
and the vertical axis is the 휂-axis. If 휂 is sufficiently large compared to 휁 , then full information
disclosure is optimal by (i). If 휁 is sufficiently large compared to 휂, then partial information
disclosure is optimal by (ii). Otherwise, no information disclosure is optimal by (iii). It is
straightforward to show that the condition in (iii) holds if and only if 푐 ≤ 푑 ≤ −푐/(푛 − 1). That
is, no information structure is optimal if and only if푊 is negative semidefinite.
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), Bergemann and Morris (2012, 2013), and Ui and Yoshizawa
(2015) study this class of LQG games. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Ui and Yoshizawa
(2015) focus on information structures in which player’s signal consists of an idiosyncratic
private signal and a public signal. In particular, Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) obtain the optimal
combination of them.9 On the other hand, Bergemann and Morris (2012, 2013) characterize
the set of all symmetric BCE. Moreover, they obtain the optimal information structure in the
special case of 휁 = 휂 = 1, which corresponds the total expected profit in the Cournot game.
In contrast, we have characterized the optimal information structures for arbitrary quadratic
objective functions in terms of the property of the matrix푊 and, in particular, the coefficients
of the objective functions, 휁 and 휂.
9Ui (2016b) considers a symmetric LQG game with endogenous private information acquisition and character-
izes the optimal public information disclosure.
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Figure 1: The optimal information structures on the 휁휂 plane
5 Public information structures
In this section, we study anLQG information design problemwhen the set of feasible information
structures is that of public information structures, i.e., Π = Π푝. As discussed in Section 3.3, it
is enough to solve (22).
Recall that 퐷 in (22) is an 푛× 푘 matrix of rank 푘 such that var(휃) = 퐷퐷⊤ and 푘 is the rank of
var(휃). The matrix 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 is factored as푈Λ푈⊤, where푈 = [푢1, . . . , 푢푘 ] is a 푘 × 푘 orthogonal
matrix and Λ = diag (휆1, . . . , 휆푘 ) is a 푘 × 푘 diagonal matrix with 휆1 ≥ · · · ≥ 휆푚 > 0 ≥ 휆푚+1 ≥
· · · ≥ 휆푘 . Note that 푢1, . . . , 푢푘 are eigenvectors of 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 and 휆1, . . . , 휆푘 are eigenvalues
associated with them. We write 푈푚 = [푢1, . . . , 푢푚], which is a 푘 × 푚 matrix consisting of
the eigenvectors with strictly positive eigenvalues. The following proposition characterizes the
optimal public information structures in terms of푈푚.
Proposition 12. A public signal under the optimal public information structure is given by
푡0 = 푈⊤푚 (퐷⊤퐷)−1퐷⊤휃, and the maximum of the objective function equals the sum of the positive
eigenvalues 휆1 + · · · + 휆푚. In particular, if 푘 = 푛, then we can choose 퐷 = var(휃)1/2, i.e., the
principle square root of var(휃), so the optimal public signal is 푡0 = 푈⊤푚var(휃)−1/2휃.
Recall Propositions 6 and 7: if 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 is negative semidefinite, i.e., all the eigenvalues are
nonpositive, then no information disclosure is optimal, and if 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 is positive semidefinite,
i.e., all the eigenvalues are nonnegative, then full information disclosure is optimal. Proposi-
tion 12 generalizes Propositions 6 and 7 by identifying the optimal public signal when 퐷⊤푉푄퐷
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is neither positive nor negative semidefinite. In particular, it is shown that the maximum of the
objective function equals the sum of the positive eigenvalues of 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 and the optimal public
signal is constructed from the corresponding eigenvectors 푢1, . . . , 푢푚.
To prove Proposition 12, we can directly use the result of Tamura (2017). Tamura (2017)
studies a Bayesian persuasion problem (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), or an information
design problem with a single player, with a quadratic objective function. In his model, an
individual receives a signal 푡 about a state vector 휃 ∈ R푛, and the individual’s best response
is assumed to be 퐸 [휃 |푡] ∈ R푛. The objective function is given by 푊 • 푆, where 푊 ∈ S푛 is a
constant matrix and 푆 = var(퐸 [휃 |푡]) ∈ S푛+ is the covariance matrix of the individual’s action.
Tamura (2017) shows that the maximization of the objective function is reduced to
max
푆
푊 • 푆 s.t. 푆 ∈ S푛+ and var(휃) − 푆 ∈ S푛+ . (33)
He obtains a closed form solution by assuming that var(휃) has rank 푛 but without assuming a
normal distribution of 휃 and 푡. Tamura (2017) also demonstrates that (33) is useful in studying
an LQG network game with 푛 players and obtains an optimal public information structure in a
special case of an LQG network game when var(휃) has full rank 푛. Thus, Proposition 12 is a
generalization of the results of Tamura (2017) where var(휃) does not necessarily have rank 푛
(such as a common value payoff structure).
When var(휃) has rank 푛 in our LQG information design problemwith 푛 players, we can solve
(22) and obtain 푡0 = 푈⊤푚var(휃)−1/2휃 in Proposition 12 by using the solution of (33) obtained
by Tamura (2017). When the rank of var(휃) is strictly less than 푘 , however, we must modify
the solution of Tamura (2017). Thus, we provide a proof for completeness. The proof is more
direct and simpler because we use the properties of normal distributions, which Tamura (2017)
does not assume in solving (33).
Proof of Proposition 12. Recall (23) in the proof of Proposition 6. Note that
퐷⊤푉푄퐷 • 푆 =
푘Õ
푙=1
휆푙훾푙 ≤
푚Õ
푙=1
휆푙 (34)
because 휆푙 > 0 if and only if 푙 ≤ 푚 and 0 ≤ 훾푙 ≤ 1 for all 푙. We show that 푡0 = 푈⊤푚 (퐷⊤퐷)−1퐷⊤휃
achieves the upper bound
Í푚
푙=1 휆푙 in (34).
We use the following properties of multivariate normal distributions. When two random
vectors 푋1 ∈ R푛1 and 푋2 ∈ R푛2 are jointly normally distributed with cov(푋푖, 푋 푗 ) = Σ푖 푗 for 푖, 푗 ∈
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{1, 2}, the covariance matrix of the conditional expectation of 푋2 given 푋1 is var(퐸 [푋2 |푋1]) =
Σ21(Σ11)−1Σ12. Using this, we can verify that var(퐸 [휃 |푡0]) = 퐷푈푚 (푈⊤푚푈푚)−1푈푚퐷⊤ and
푉푄 • var(퐸 [휃 |푡0]) = tr (푉푄퐷푈푚 (푈⊤푚푈푚)−1푈푚⊤퐷⊤)
= tr (퐷⊤푉푄퐷푈푚푈푚⊤)
= tr (푈Λ푈⊤푈푚푈푚⊤)
= tr (Λ푈⊤푈푚푈푚⊤푈) =
푚Õ
푙=1
휆푙 .
The last equality holds because푈⊤푈푚 = [훿푖 푗 ]푘×푚, where 훿푖 푗 is the Kronecker delta. □
Proposition 12 has the following implication for optimality of partial information disclo-
sure in Π∗ when 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 is neither negative semidefinite nor positive semidefinite, which
complements Corollary 8.
Corollary 13. If 퐷⊤푉푄퐷 is neither negative semidefinite nor positive semidefinite, then partial
information disclosure is optimal in Π∗.
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